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NATURAL LAW TENDENCIES IN
CONTEMPORARY GERMAN
JURISPRUDENCE
THE SECOND HALF of the nineteenth century most German jurists had
been accustomed to consider as law every command of the state that claimed to
be law. It was not until the terrible experience of the Nazi regime caused
German jurists to raise again the question of the nature of law that they began
once more to reflect upon the reality, the function, and the essence of natural
law. In a recent articlel Erich Fechner observes that the question of the nature
of law and the so-called problem of natural law really are different designations
for the same thing. He is undoubtedly right. The question of what law is,
says Fechner, can be answered

SINCE

in two different ways. One says that law is an accidental order, determined
by the respective historical circumstances and changing political and economic
conditions. According to this answer, law is not something fixed and reliable, but a relative phenomenon that is modified by changing conditions ...
The other one maintains that law rests on eternal basic norms, founded in
either reason or divine will. These norms endure from the beginning of
time in uncontestable authority; they are independent of relative circumstances and above all independent of the wishes and views of men ....
This
is the issue on which the so-called natural law debate has turned for more
than two thousand years. It is the crucial point of all legal thinking. The
history of legal philosophy is a seesaw between these two basic views.
Fechner goes on to point out that in German legal philosophy since the
Second World War one can distinguish two periods: during the first, natural
law was advancing, and the term itself became fashionable and was accepted
as a guiding criterion almost as a matter of course; in the second, however,
natural law doctrine was forced to defend itself, while a good many jurists
returned to the former habit of deriding any notion of a scientifically knowable
natural law. The first period is characterized by a penetrating criticism of
positive law, a criticism resulting in the affirmation of natural law. Characteristic of the second period is a no less penetrating criticism of the various traditional schools of natural law, a criticism resulting in a deepening of the various
views about the function and essence of natural law.
In another recent publication 2 Erik Wolf attempts to clarify the present
situation of thinking in the field of natural law, to put the various theories into
systematic order and to analyze the different solutions of the problem. Wolf
starts from the notion that the difference among theories lies in various conceptions of nature as well as of law, since the idea of natural law obviously depends
as much on one as on another. He distinguishes nine different theses about
nature and again nine different concepts of law, each of which he links with
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a specific idea about natural law. Such ambiguity in the idea of natural law
must necessarily lead to a multitude of theoretical conflicts and contradictory
goals among those who apply the concept of natural law. Out of this great
number of theoretical possibilities which Wolf demonstrates in a masterly fashion,
we will select only a few which are particularly characteristic of the now prevailing views in Germany.
One may distinguish two different currents in the natural law tendencies
in postwar German jurisprudence, according to the position from which the
question is raised: one group approaches the problem of natural law on the
basis of traditional philosophical positions, while the other group approaches
it from the basis of the problems and experiences of contemporary thinking.
On the basis of traditional positions Neo-Thomism attempts to solve the
problem of natural law. In Germany it has developed a theory usually called
the Catholic doctrine of natural law. Its representatives in Germany today are
primarily Johannes Messner of Vienna with his voluminous work on natural
5
law,3 Ernst von Hippel of Cologne,4 and Ginther Kfichenhoff of Wfirzburg.
Another member of this group is the Viennese professor Alfred von Verdross,
who formerly was strongly influenced by Hans Kelsen. In this connection one
must also mention Heinrich Kipp, Arthur Wegner, Adolf Sfisterhenn, and
Valentin Tomberg, the latter a disciple of Ernst von Hippel. The Catholic
natural law theorists see nature above all as the creation of God; and natural
law as a law that results from the essence of creation and is recognizable by
human reason. Natural law characteristically transcends positive law. Catholic
theory conceives this transcending character of natural law as a reference from
creation to the Creator: natural law is thus conceived metaphysically. As Wolf
has shown, at the core of this doctrine is the problem of the basis of law, and
both the faith in and the search after an absolute and timeless law. The doctrine
faces the perennial antinomy between timeless natural law and the historical
character of positive law.
Over against the Catholic theory of natural law there is a Protestant theology
of law-in part a deliberate and accentuated opposition. It does not always
use the terminology and the concept of natural law, as evidenced, for instance,
in a sensational article by the President of the Federal Supreme Court, Hermann
Weinkauff. 6 To some extent it even rejects the term and the concept; but
the main intent and the fundamental approach are the same, irrespective of
the terminological question. The most important representatives of the Protestant
theology of law are Erik Wolf of Freiburg, 7 Walter Sch6nfeld of Tiibingen,S
and Ulrich Scheuner of Bonn. 9 In addition one should mention Hans Liermann,
Ernst Wolf, and Hans Dombois.
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This Protestant theology of law has much in common with the Catholic theory
of natural law. In both views the justice of positive law does not contain its
own justification; both interpret transpositive law in metaphysical terms; both
revolve around a central doctrine of the basis of law. Still, the Protestant theology
of law does not really recognize natural law in the sense of the Catholic theory:
sinful, fallen man, according to its teaching, is barred from perceiving true justice;
the sinful creature can know the norms of eternal law not from created nature and
its essential order, but only through the word of the Creator himself. The
Catholic theory of natural law, at any rate, is also based on anthropology, while
the eternal law of the Protestant doctrine, as Erik Wolf points out, is founded
in Christology. This eternal law is in a sense transcendent in inverse direction
from that of Catholic natural law: it transcends God in the direction of man.
The Word as a revelation of law stands in the midst of the world and of a history
conceived as a process of salvation. The antinomy which here is to be resolved
is that between Christian and worldly existence.
Besides these two religious versions of modem German natural law thinking
there are two other branches having their origin in philosophy: in the objective
idealism of Hegel and the subjective idealism of Kant. Both Neo-Hegelians and
Neo-Kantians raise the question of natural law-like the Neo-Thomists---from
the point of view of tradition. It is significant that the label common to these
three views is contained in the prefix "neo."
Neo-Hegelianism has taken little part in the discussion of natural law since
the Second World War. In part this is the result of the heavy mortgage burdening Neo-Hegelianism, for some of its ideas were exploited politically by National
Socialism. The most significant contribution of Neo-Hegelianism to the problem
of the nature of law is the last work of Gerhard Dulckkeit of Kiel.10 In addition
there is a paper by Karl Larenz of Kiel.11 Erich Kaufmann of Bonn has not
written on the problem of natural law since he courageously professed the
idea of law in his Hague lectures of 1935. The idea of natural law in modem
Neo-Hegelianism is found mostly in a curious connection with the concept of
history, a connection that, according to Erik Wolf, is usually alien to thinking
about natural law. Erik Wolf points out that the historicity of law in the sense
of its determining idea is here meant as the necessity of its development, which
from the beginning has governed the history of law. In other words, historicity
here does not connote change and transition but rather a perennial law of
development that underlies all variety and mutation and recurs in all phenomena
of law. If, in the eyes of Neo-Hegelianism, there can be a natural law, it would
be transcendent with respect to positive law in the sense in which the unchangeability of historical dialectic transcends the changeability of each moment in
history. The center of such a theory would be formed by a doctrine about the
idea of law. Such a conception of natural law of Neo-Hegelian variety is by no
means the only way of getting from Hegel to an understanding of the problem
of natural law. A still missing and badly needed interpretation of Hegel that is
10.
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founded on the object-logic might lead to new insights into the problem
of natural law.
The connection between natural law and the philosophy of history is to be
found today not only among the few representatives of Neo-Hegelianism who
seriously try to solve the problem of natural law. It also characterizes the thought
of Heinrich Mitteis of Munich. 1 2 Likewise, Thomas Wiirtenberger of Freiburg,
although having some reservations with respect to the renaissance of natural law
in our time, seeks to find in history typical legal norms. Not absolute in nature,
they nevertheless constitute a more basic legitimizing of legal decisions in concrete situations.
Much greater than the influence of Neo-Hegelianism, in recent years, has
been the influence of Neo-Kantianism on German legal philosophy. Neo-Kantian
influence appears today in three different schools of thought about natural law.
First, Kant's subjective idealism has led to a theory which, following Rudolf
Stammler, construes natural law along purely logical lines. This school is today
represented by Jilrgen von Kempski.1 3 Natural law logically construed ultimately
coincides, as Erik Wolf has pointed out, with the correct method of legal thinking,
the logic of jurisprudence, since it is the quintessence of what is "correctly"
thought or known. It transcends positive law in the sense of transcending the
historical aspects, ethical principles, psychological compulsions, and sociological
conditions which may become the respective content of law; in other words, it
is pure form transcending substance, form for which the content is irrelevant.
The central part of such a logically construed natural law is a theory of the fundamental concepts of law; the crucial question is that of what law is logically
possible and hence formally correct; the antinomy to be solved is one between
actually observed substance and logically correct form. This antinomy originates
in the presupposition of a world of being as conflicting with a world of oughtness.
With this branch of Neo-Kantianism one may possibly--although only to a
certain extent-group the attempts of Carl August Emgel 4 to approach natural
law. Emge is influenced not only by Kant but doubtless also by Nietzsche and
the formalistic and axiomatic thinking of Hilbert. For Emge the ultimate basis of
obligation of empirical law is the pure "idea" in which reality and nornativity
coincide, this idea being conceived as the highest a priori normative principle,
the zero point in a system of logical categories which condition all facts. This
a priori idea and any other a priori criteria derived from it by way of logical inference are logically necessary in the sense that they cannot be anything different
from what they are. Emge's path leads through a series of successive concretizations in the realm of the real as well as in that of logical correctness from that zero
point to the concrete situation in which positive law exists. He works with a
transcendence pointing from the categorical into the empirical sphere. Emge,
too, construes the transpositive origin of positive law in a logical way; and the
central part of his legal theory is also a doctrine of the fundamental concepts
of law.
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A second branch of Neo-Kantianism has an utterly different idea, for it
construes natural law ethically. On the basis of Kant's philosophy, Rudolf von
Laun of Hamburg in his famous address on Ethics and Law in 1924 had already
predicted a renaissance of natural law theory. The idea which Laun first
developed in this address-that the obligation of law could ultimately root only
in a norm which the obligated person had in full substance given to himselfis later on consistently developed in Laun's subsequent publications. 1 5 What he
considers natural law is always the autonomously posited and autonomously
known law of individual consciousness which alone has obligatory force. Just
as many Neo-Hegelians have exaggerated the objectivity of Hegel's idealism, so
Laun, who among the Neo-Kantians is the critic closest to Kant himself, pushes
the subjectivity of Kant's idealism to its ultimate possibilities. One may well doubt
that in Laun's doctrine of natural law there is still a genuine transcendence, since
positive law too becomes obligatory, according to Laun, only through the individual consciousness of duty. At most, one may see here the consciousness of
duty transcending the actual performance of duty.
Laun's principles of legal theory had already been fully developed before the
Second World War. After the war, Helmut Coing of Frankfortl 6 sought to
re-establish natural law in the sense of Kantian idealism. He leaned on the
philosophy of values as developed by Max Scheler and Nicola Hartmann. Starting with the value consciousness of man, Coing tries to discover a system of
supreme ethical values of law and substantive principles of law which would
constitute the criteria and legitimation of positive law. Coing's natural law
transcends positive law in the sense that the realm of consciousness and conscience transcends the realm of external conduct; but unlike Laun, he does not
deny that the positive law outside this realm of consciousness is law; nor does he
conceive it as mere projection or as an appeal to the inner sphere.
Despite the many differences between Laun's and Coing's theories, they both
have in common not only the basis of Kantian philosophy, but also the conception
of natural law as an ethically obligatory order. The centerpiece of this ethically
construed natural law is a theory of the fundamental principles of law; the crucial
question is which norms are substantively right. The antinomy to be solved is
one between the practical concern that exploits the protection of legality and
the ethos that seeks the path of morality.
A third Neo-Kantian school of thought is to be found in Gustav Radbruch's
last works. 17 Radbruch's starting point is the double thesis that legal norms on
the one hand are formed out of the stuff of social facts-which stuff thus enters
into the idea of law-and on the other hand have obligatory force only because of
the value inherent in these norms--which values legitimize and criticize all
positive law. Transpositive law is the sum total of those principles of law which,
as the expression of the idea of law, are inherent in and stronger than any positive
15.
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rule. These principles of law, in Radbruch's view, are not above but within posi-tive law. Any positive rule which does not express the idea of law, i.e., any act
that contradicts transpositive law, does not have legal authority for Radbruch.
Radbruch is envisaging a transpositive idea of law that transcends social data,
factual necessities and purposes. He construes natural law, if we are to give
this name to his transpositive law, in ontological terms. The centerpiece of his
theory is, therefore, a doctrine of the fundamental structure of law. His chief
question is the obligatory force of law. To answer this question, he must of course
clarify the previous question of the substance of the idea of law. That substance,
for Radbruch, is simply justice, seen in three dimensions as formal justice, the
principle of the predictability or calculability of law, and suitability to ideal ends
-- dimensions among which there is continuous tension. A conflict between
them is ultimately a conflict of justice with itself, or rather the inevitable debate
of justice With itself which is essential to law. Without this antinomy there can
be no law; its solution is the perennial task of law. The principle of predictability
(Rechtssicherheit) argues in favor of a legal act which in fact may violate formal
justice even though it may endeavor to realize that justice. But where there is
not even this endeavor, or where the act violates justice in a degree unbearable
to the individual conscience, positive law has to give way before transpositive
law. The decision about this last question, as we gather from Radbruch, must
be made in the realm of dialectic consciousness and individual conscience.
This last idea is rejected by Hans Welzel of Bonn.1 8 Hans Wezel also construes natural law ontologically-in a certain way. His philosophical premises
are quite different from those of Radbruch. That is why he does not envisage
a dialectic tension between the ontological and the ethical conception of natural
law, a tension which Radbruch sees not only in terms of a necessary difference
(that much Welzel acknowledges), but also in terms of a necessary and inescapable relation. Wezel rejects the value content of traditional theories of
natural law and finally arrives at the assumption of a certain materio-logical
structure in the object which he considers the guiding criteria of legal rules
limiting the arbitrariness of legislators and embodying eternal truths.
Radbruch and Erik Wolf--somewhat alike in their thinking-already went
beyond the starting point of tradition and raised the question of natural law
from the point of view of the time, that is from the existence of man, his innermost core and his experience of himself. This latter approach wholly characterizes the work of Erich Fechner of Tiibingen,19 as well as that of Wemer Maihofer
2
of Wiirzburg. O
Both approach the problem of natural law from the existentialism of Jaspers
and Heidegger; both also have root in the realm of religion; both see the tremendous tension between the static doctrines of classical natural law and the
dynamism of time; both are still groping, searching, and trail-blazing rather than
quietly observing things from a fixed point of view. Fechner opposes a natural
law with a developing substance to a natural law with fixed substance and a
18.
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natural law with changeable substance. Man participates in this developing
natural law through acts of distinction and decision; at the risk of his existence
he tries out the tenability of something new. The risky decision on values which
again and again confronts man in this developing natural law is, according to
Fechner, part of man's essence. The existential necessity of choice springs precisely from the regularities and conditions of the social sphere. Maihofer, one
of Erik WoWs disciples, distinguishes between existential (subjective) and institutional (objective) natural law; he tries to construe natural law as a right of
human existence. Thus interpreted, natural law expresses the ego-existence
(Selbstsein) of an individual in his uniqueness as well as the qua-existence
(Alssein) of a person in society, inasmuch as he participates in typological situations qua father, qua husband, qua doctor, qua judge, qua citizen, qua neighbor,
etc.
This brief survey could cover only the most important currents of natural
law theory in contemporary Germany and only the most important theoreticians
and their books. But however short, the survey serves to show that the problem
of natural law is today the center of the theoretical discussion of law in Germany.
If one adds that the highest German courts--the Federal Constitutional Court
and the Federal Supreme Court-have adopted natural law ideas in some of
their basic decisions, one perceives that Rudolf Laun's prophecy of 1924-that
natural law would be reborn in Germany-is about to be fulfilled.
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